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INTRODUCTION

Many who have looked at the relationship between copyright
protection and the fair use defense' have concluded that finding a
fair use is, at best, a matter of balancing hard-to-define equitable
considerations, or at worst, a matter of luck.2 Additionally, for
those of the orthodox school, obtaining a fair use exception in
court is simply a matter of marshalling more emotionally appealing
equities for fair use than the creator of the work can offer against
fair use. Most of the copyright commentators have argued that the
fair use case law is largely unprincipled and unpredictable.
1. Copyright law provides protection to authors and creators of certain original forms
of intellectual property. Typically, the author of an original work is given the exclusive
right to control subsequent copying and use of the original. The fair use doctrine provides an exception to the generally broad protection afforded to authors by copyright. It
allows secondary users to utilize and copy an original work while neither obtaining permission nor paying any fee to the author. For a more complete explanation of copyright
and fair use, see infra notes 80-137 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., MITCHELL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.6, at 298
(1989) (describing the common law as being in "disarray," and of "questionable applicability," and asserting that the modern copyright statute "has not led to predictable results"); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[A] (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER] (arguing that the modern copyright law "does
not, and does not purport, to provide a rule which may automatically be applied in deciding whether any particular use is 'fair' "); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 362-63 (1985) [hereinafter PATRY] (arguing that the
copyright statute "gives little guidance outside of certain examples of potential uses," and
asserting that courts need not be limited to considering the four enumerated factors in the
statute).
3. See supra note 2.
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In this Article, we challenge the orthodox view of fair use. The
central theme we develop is that fair use is a predictable, necessary,
and principled exception to the general protection offered by copyright law. We believe that the case law exhibits an inner consistency that for too long has gone misunderstood, and we argue,
additionally, that the case law reflects a strong tendency to take
one overriding principle into account-the principle of economic
substitution.4 We contend that the case law supports a fair use defense only when the secondary use5 does not act as an economic
substitute for the original. If economic substitution is found, the
fair use defense fails. On the other hand, if no economic substitution exists, the law allows the secondary use under the fair use
exception.
We begin, in Section II, by defining the orthodox balancing analysis as it was applied in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp.6 Because Kinko's is an extremely useful case for understanding the failings of the current approach to fair use, in Section III
we examine each prong of the balancing analysis used in that case.
Although the Kinko's court may have reached the right answer, it
did so for all of the wrong reasons. Kinko's shows that the orthodox gloss on fair use does not take into account the inner consistency of the common law, the federal copyright statute, and most
importantly, the actual fair use cases. In Section IV, we examine
the history of copyright and fair use and demonstrate the law's
inner consistency and its recognition of the principle of economic
substitution. Finally, we suggest a positive analysis of copyright
and fair use as a solution.
Copyright and fair use, viewed from all directions, is a body of
law that implicitly recognizes the principle of economic substitution. As this Article will demonstrate, the fair use critics are
wrong. Our analysis suggests that a coherent theory of predictable
law exists and that the law is understandable for lawyers, teachers,
business people, and judges in analyzing copyright fair use.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE DECEPTIVE ORTHODOXY:

BASIC BOOKS, INC

v. KINKO'S GRAPHICS CORP.

A. Fair Use Under the Copyright Act of 1976
Congress codified the copyright and fair use case law in the
4. See infra part IV.D.
5. Secondary use in this Article refers to the use made of copyrighted material by a
second user.
6. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Copyright Act of 1976. 7 Section 107 of the Act governs fair use.
The preamble to section 107 lists several examples of what might
be successful assertions of the fair use defense.' Drawing on prior
case law, Congress enumerated four factors for determining
whether a use qualifies as a fair use. The four factors are formulated in section 107 as follows:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.9
In fair use cases decided after the 1976 Act, courts have focused
their analysis on the four statutory factors of section 107.
Although Congress had hoped that the Copyright Act would clarify the existing law and lead to a more uniform and predictable
body of case law, 10 courts have frequently had difficulty with the
four-factor analysis." Despite Congress's expressed intent not to
enlarge the common law's approach to fair use law, some courts
have accorded each of the four factors equal weight and applied a
balancing test. Because of the ambiguity of section 107, many
courts look to the section's legislative history for guidance in bal2
ancing the four factors.'
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1992).
8. The statute states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976). These purposes can be regarded as uses that will not compete with the author's
original work. See also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1990) [hereinafter Leval].
9. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). These factors closely parallel those announced by Justice
Story in the early case of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901); see also infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 1476].
11. Recent Supreme Court cases have been decided by five-to-four split decisions,
with majority and dissenting opinions disagreeing on how each of the four factors supports the defendant's claim. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding defendant not guilty of infringement because the public was
making fair use copies of the plaintiff's television programs); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding the defendant guilty of infringement
even though news reporting is one of the uses given specific mention in the preamble to
§ 107).
12. Some prominent judges, however, have been highly critical of using legislative
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B.

Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.
1. Factual Background

A recently decided copyright infringement case, Basic Books,
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,13 provides insight into the inadequacy of the orthodox balancing analysis. The plaintiffs, eight
large New York publishers, produce and market books and sell
licenses to others to use their copyrighted works. The defendant,
Kinko's Graphics Corporation, owns and franchises about 500
copy shops throughout the United States, most of which are located near university campuses. Kinko's college campus shops
specialize in serving the academic community.
At issue in Kinko's was the legality of a photocopying service
known as the "Professor Publishing" program. 4 For this program, two Kinko's photocopy stores in New York City began photocopying, compiling, and selling college course packets that
included excerpts from twelve works owned by the eight publishers. i5 The publishers filed suit against Kinko's to enjoin the Professor Publishing program, charging that the two Kinko's shops had
reproduced copyrighted material in violation of the 1976 Copyright Act.1 6 The publishers specifically complained that Kinko's
infringed on their copyrights when it copied excerpts from the
history to elucidate the black letter law. The most notable critics have been the "New
Textualists," currently best represented by United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia. For example, Justice Scalia has argued that Congress probably never reads the socalled legislative history; that legislative intent is not discernible from legislative history;
that the use of legislative history permits manipulation of the law; and that it is not the
duty of courts to search for the legislature's intent. Instead, courts should apply the law
as passed. See Justice Antonin Scalia, The Use of Legislative History: JudicialAbdication
to FictitiousIntent, Speech for the Howard J. Trienens Visiting Judicial Scholar Program,
Northwestern University School of Law (Sept. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Scalia].
13. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
14. Id. at 1528. The "Professor Publishing" program worked as follows: A professor
selected the materials he or she wished to have photocopied and bound into a course
packet and dropped them off at a Kinko's shop for copying. If any of the selected materials were copyrighted, the professor was required by Kinko's to make an independent
determination of which copyrighted works needed permission for reproduction from the
publisher. If Kinko's employees determined that the requested materials went beyond
the permissible level of photocopying under the fair use doctrine, they required that the
professor obtain permission before Kinko's would proceed further. Kinko's would assist
with this process. Once the appropriate permissions were obtained or it was determined
that the excerpts fell within fair use, Kinko's reproduced a number of copies corresponding to the number of students actually registered in the professor's class. The students
were directed to Kinko's where they purchased the course packets. The packets were
sold at the same rate as any copying project, about four cents per page.
15. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 5, Kinko's, (No. 89 Civ. 2807
(CBM)) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum].
16. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1526.
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plaintiffs' books without permission and then sold those copies for
a profit to nearby college students. 17 In answering the complaint,
Kinko's admitted that it had copied the excerpts and that the
plaintiffs' copyrights were valid. However, Kinko's argued that it
had a right to copy and sell the excerpts of the plaintiffs' works
under the doctrine of "fair use," as specifically codified in section
107 of the Copyright Act.'
2.

The Orthodox Balancing Analysis

The court began its analysis by explaining that a historical common law interpretation of the fair use doctrine would be necessary
because section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 was "intended to
'restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way.' "'p Citing two well known Supreme
Court cases,2° the court concluded that fair use is an "equitable
rule of reason" and that "a common law interpretation proceeds
on a case-by-case basis. "21 Then, after stressing the unprecedented
nature of the case, the court examined the Professor Publishing
program under the fair use doctrine as codified in the Copyright
22
Act.

The court employed an orthodox balancing analysis in which it
examined the defendant's conduct in light of the four statutory factors, 23 the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines24 contained in the

legislative history, and other equitable policy considerations.25 After finding that a majority of those factors weighed against
Kinko's, the court held that Kinko's was not entitled to a fair use
privilege and was liable for copyright infringement. 26 The following summary of the Kinko's court's analysis demonstrates how the
practice of merely balancing the four statutory fair use factors, and
viewing fair use as an equitable question in general, fails to yield a
meaningful analysis.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1529 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 10).
20. Id. at 1530 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
21. Id. at 1529-30.
22. Id. at 1530.
23. Id. at 1530-34; see also text accompanying note 9.
24. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1535-37; see also infra notes 60-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines found in the legislative history).
25. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1534-35.
26. Id. at 1547.
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III.

PROBLEM: THE BALANCING ANALYSIS-THE FAILURE OF
THE KINKo's COURT

A.
1.

The Four Factors in Section 107

Purpose and Character of the Secondary Use

The orthodox balancing analysis employed by the Kinko's court
was problematic because each side could easily cite language from
the Copyright Act that was favorable to its position. For example,
although the first factor of section 107 sanctions fair use when the
copying is educational, it prohibits fair use when the copying is
commercial. 27 Because the copying was both educational and commercial in Kinko's, this case reveals the weakness of the orthodox
balancing approach to fair use.
Both parties addressed their arguments to the court's orthodox
balancing analysis. The publishers argued vehemently that
Kinko's, as a profit-making company, was not entitled to a fair use
privilege. 28 Kinko's countered that the professors' use of the photocopied material served nonprofit educational purposes.2 9
Kinko's further argued that when teaching and education are involved, the scope of the fair use doctrine must be wider.3°
After an orthodox balancing of the equities, the Kinko's court
held that the first factor of the fair use analysis tipped in favor of
the publishers. 31 The court relied on the fact that Kinko's made a
profit.3 2 In ruling against Kinko's on the first prong of the fourpart test, the court reasoned that commercial concerns and educa27. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
28. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 15, at 27 (citing Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 562; Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451). In Sony Corp., the Court stated that "[t]he
prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any
countervailing benefit. Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner
of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter." Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at
450-51. Similarly, in Harper & Row, the Court stated that "[t]he crux of the profit/
nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
29. Defendant's Proposed Conclusions of Law at 3, Kinko's, (No. 89 Civ. 2807
(CBM)) [hereinafter Defendant's Proposed Conclusions]. Kinko's argued that since
§ 107 expressly mentions "teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use)" as a
privileged use under the statute, the need to promote the vital public interest in education
weighed heavily in favor of finding fair use. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992)).
30. Id. at 6. In this vein, Kinko's argued that denying educators the fair use exception would destroy the policy of broadly disseminating information that underlies the
copyright laws. Id. at 23-25.
31. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1532.
32. Id. at 1531.
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tional concerns were mutually exclusive.33 In effect, the court reasoned that regardless of the end use, fair use had to be denied if the
defendant stood to gain financially.
The court's analysis under the first prong of the balancing test
defies logic. The Kinko's court suggested that if the professors had
made their photocopies at a not-for-profit shop, the copying may
have been permissible.34 Thus, under the court's strained logic, a
professor's use of a not-for-profit copy shop would constitute a
valid fair use-even though the copyright holders would suffer
identical injury and even if the students paid more for the copies.
2.

Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Addressing the second factor in section 107, Kinko's presented
four arguments: (1) some of the books were either out of print or
unavailable; (2) all of the books were published; (3) the books were
factual in nature; and (4) no evidence at trial suggested the books
were "school text books."' 35 Kinko's argued that when a book is
"out of print and unavailable for purchase through normal chan36
nels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it." Of
the twelve books cited in the case, three were out of print and one
was out of stock.3 7 Thus, Kinko's reasoned that with respect to
these four books, the second factor weighed in its favor.38
In considering the second factor, the court agreed with Kinko's
but assumed that the second factor turned on whether the original
works were factual or nonfactual. 39 Finding that the plaintiffs'
works were factual in nature, the Kinko's court stated, without argument, that the second factor weighed in favor of Kinko's. 4°
3.

Amount and Substantiality Used

Continuing its orthodox balancing analysis, the Kinko's court
33. Id. at 1531-32. The court stated that "[t]he extent of [Kinko's] insistence that
theirs are educational concerns and not profit-making ones boggles the mind." Id. at
1532.
34. Id. at 1536 n.13.
35. Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 6-8.
36. Id. at 7 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533. The court noted that "the scope of fair use is
greater with respect to factual than non-factual works." Id. at 1532 (quoting New Era
Publications v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990)).
40. Id. at 1533. The court never discussed the nature of the works as being "textbooks" or essentially intended for use by students. Most textbooks are factual in nature.
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proceeded to consider the third factor in section 107.11 Again,
each litigant cited language from the Copyright Act in favor of its
position. The publishers argued that Kinko's copied too much,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, to be entitled to a fair use
privilege.42 Kinko's countered that the portions copied were both
quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with a fair use privilege.43 Kinko's also denied the plaintiffs' assertion that the sections
copied were so important that they represented the essence of the
works.'
After balancing the equities of the parties' arguments, the
Kinko's court determined that the amount and substantiality of the
copied portions weighed against Kinko's and in favor of the plaintiffs. 45 The court acknowledged that there were no absolute rules
about how much of a copyrighted work could be copied and still
remain within the protection of fair use.46 Relying on Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,47 the court reasoned
that both the quantity and the quality of the work copied should be
considered.48
41. Id. at 1533-34.
42. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 15, at 31-34.
43. Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 9-12. Kinko's cited several
prior decisions in support of its argument: In Sony Corp., the Court held that "the fact
that the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use." 464 U.S. at 449-50 (footnote omitted). In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, the court stated: "It has sometimes been suggested that the
copying of an entire copyrighted work ... cannot ever be 'fair use,' but this is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions and rejected by years of accepted
practice." 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (footnote omitted). In Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803
F.2d. 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987), the Second Circuit
held that copying 4.3% of the plaintiff's work was fair use as a matter of law, even
though the defendant continued to copy the material after the plaintiff had denied permission. Kinko's also relied upon New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing Group, 904
F.2d 152 158 (2d Cir. 1990), in which the Second Circuit also found fair use when the
defendan? copied "a minuscule amount... 5-6% of 12 other works and 8% or more of
11 works, each of the 11 being only a few pages in length." Kinko's had copied between
5% and 14% of the works that were in print and 15% to 25% of the works that were out
of print. Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 11-12. Kinko's argued
that such copying was not quantitatively inconsistent with a finding of fair use. Id. at 12.
44. Id. Kinko's attempted to distinguish its copying from that in Harper& Row. In
Harper& Row, the defendant's newspaper had copied a mere 300 words from the plaintiff's collection of letters. 471 U.S. at 548. The Supreme Court concluded that although
the defendant had taken a small quantitative portion, the defendant had taken "what was
essentially the heart of the book." Id. at 564-65.
45. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533-34.
46. Id. at 1533. The court seemed to contradict this pronouncement in its discussion
of the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
47. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
48. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533.
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Here again, the court's balancing analysis was inadequate. In a
circular fashion, the Kinko's court proclaimed that the portions
copied were the critical parts, precisely because they were the
passages chosen for duplication by the professors.49 Under ,this
reasoning, a photocopy could never be considered fair use. Any
photocopy would include "critical parts" of the original work by
the mere fact that the part was chosen for photocopying. This type
of reasoning is obviously not helpful for those attempting to understand and predict actual case outcomes.
The court also inquired whether fair use law permitted greater
leeway for copying out-of-print materials. 50 Initially, the Kinko's
court concluded that "longer portions copied from an out-of-print
book may be fair use because the book is no longer available"; the
court later reversed itself and stated "that damage to out-of-print
books may in fact be greater since permission fees may be the only
income for authors and copyright owners."'"
The problem with this analysis is that it assumes its own conclusion: copyright owners are entitled to royalty payments. However,
this conclusion is true only if a fair use is not permissible. The fact
that royalty payments will be lost by the copyright owner is openly
acknowledged in the doctrine of fair use. The whole point of the
doctrine is to determine when a party can copy without making
royalty payments. When the Kinko's court pointed out that allowing a fair use would deny the copyright owners a royalty payment, the court did nothing but restate the obvious.
4.

Effect of the Use on the Market for the Copyrighted Work

After deciding that two of the first three fair use factors favored
the plaintiffs, the Kinko's court considered section 107's fourth factor. 2 The publishers maintained that fair use was only permitted
when the defendant's copying would not harm the cQpyright
owner's "potential market for copyrighted work." 53 The plaintiffs
49. Id.
.50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1534.
53. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting Harper&
Row, 471 U.S. at 568). The plaintiffs maintained that the potential market value of copyrighted work comes from both direct sales of the work and also from licensing income
(the sale of permissions). Id. at 36. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that Kinko's
unauthorized copying denied them potential income from the sale of permissions and
thus harmed the plaintiffs by reducing the potential market for the copyrighted work. Id.
at 35. Therefore, because Kinko's had harmed the copyright owner's potential market
for the copyrighted work, Kinko's was not entitled to fair use. Id.
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argued that they suffered harm to their potential market when they
lost permission fees.54
Kinko's disputed the plaintiffs' argument that royalty income
deserves consideration as a potential market for the copyrighted
work." Kinko's asserted that the plaintiffs' argument wrongfully
"assumes what it is trying to prove." 56 Kinko's also disputed the
proposition that there
could be any meaningful harm to the sales of
7
out-of-print books.1
Adhering to the balancing test orthodoxy, the court stated that
the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." 5 The Kinko's court reasoned that the plaintiffs
lost royalty income when the defendant copied the materials without first paying them a permission fee. The court found that this
lost fee weighed against finding fair use under the fourth factor.59
Once again, the balancing test failed. The court never seemed to
realize that its reasoning was circular. The court failed to understand that fair use will always, by definition, diminish a copyright
holder's royalty income. Thus, loss of royalty income alone cannot
be a useful factor in determining a fair use in the Kinko's case.
B.

Analysis of the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines 6 '

The district court concluded that after balancing the equities,
54. Id. at 35-40.
55. See Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 19-21.
56. Id. at 19. Kinko's used the following quotation to buttress its argument:
It is wrong to measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of presumed royalty
income-a standard which necessarily assumes that plaintiff had a right to issue
licenses. That would be true, of course, only if it were first decided that the
defendant's practices did not constitute "fair use." In determining whether the
company has been sufficiently hurt to cause these practices to become "unfair,"
one cannot assume at the start the merit of the plaintiff's position, i.e., that
plaintiff had the right to license. That conclusion results only if it is first determined that the photocopying is "unfair."
Id. at 20 (quoting Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1357 n.19).
Kinko's also relied on Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 109 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), which noted that the plaintiff's observation that the defendant copied without
permission "only begs the question: if [the defendant's] paraphrased use of the letter is
fair, then permission was not necessary." Id.
57. Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 20.
58. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1534 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566).
59. Id.
60. The House Committee reported that while "'a specific exemption freeing certain
reproduction of copyrighted works for educational and scholarly purposes from
copyright control is not justified. . . .' there is a 'need for greater certainty and protection
for teachers.'" H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 10, at 66-67 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 83,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967)). With this in mind, Congress amended 17 U.S.C. app.
§ 504(c), which limited the penalties for infringement by innocent teachers and other
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the four fair use factors alone prohibited Kinko's conduct. However, the court also tried to buttress its decision with a discussion
of the legislative history contained in the Agreement on Classroom
Guidelines ("the Agreement "1).61 Although Congress was silent regarding how the courts should use the Agreement, the Agreement
itself states that it cannot be cited as evidence of copyright
infringement.62
The parties testifying before Congress did agree that the "purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum standards
of educational fair use."' 63 Although the lobbyists equivocated on
what the Agreement permitted as a safe harbor for teachers, they
explicitly provided that it did not make any negative limitations on
educational fair use. 6'
nonprofit users of copyrighted material. Id. at 67. During committee hearings,
representatives for teachers and publishers each presented opposing testimony on how
fair use ought to affect photocopying for classroom use. The chairman of the
subcommittee, along with other members, urged the two groups to meet and "achieve a
meeting of the minds as to permissible educational uses of copyrighted material." Id.
After considerable negotiation, the groups reached a tentative compromise on classroom
photocopying and drafted a statement reflecting the negotiated agreement. The subcommittee inserted the text of the groups' compact into the Committee Report as the
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational
Institutions. Id. at 68-70.
61. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1535-37.
62. The Agreement on Classroom Guidelines states that it is not intended to be a
limitation on fair use:
The purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum standards of
educational fair use under Section 107 ....

[T]he following statement of guide-

lines is not intended to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards
of fair use under judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107 ....
There may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 10, at 66-68 (emphasis added). The Agreement also
states:
[T]he extent of permissible copying for educational purposes may change in the
future; that certain types of copying permitted under these guidelines may not
be permissible in the future; and conversely that in the future other types of
copying not permitted under these guidelines may be permissible under revised
guidelines.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added). While a cursory reading of these passages may confuse the
casual reader, close inspection reveals that such language only discusses the parties' ability to modify the Guidelines in the future, without casting doubt on the purpose of the
guidelines to state the minimum fair use standards.
63. Id.
64. Id. The following excerpt from the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines demonstrates why a party who copied in excess of the Agreement would not necessarily be guilty
of copyright infringement:
[T]he following statement of guidelines is not intended to limit the types of
copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision and
which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision bill. There may be
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Ignoring the stated purpose behind the Agreement on Classroom
Guidelines, the court primarily focused on Kinko's for-profit status. The court asked whether Kinko's qualified for any educational consideration when it acted "as a for-profit corporation, and
[with] its profitmaking intent."65 Although the professors' and students' photocopying might have qualified as fair use, the court rejected Kinko's argument that it was in service to the educational
community.66 The court wrote: "Classroom and library copying
are viewed more sympathetically 'since they generally involve no
commercial exploitation and . . . [have] socially useful objectives ....
[T]his is not true of photocopy shops, which reproduce
for profit.' "67
The court engaged in a balancing analysis of Kinko's conduct
under the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines as if it were actually
a controlling part of the law within the Copyright Act.6" Though
the court initially equivocated on whether the Agreement stated the
minimum or maximum allowable copying under the fair use doctrine, 69 it ultimately determined that a "violation" of the Agreement was yet another factor to be weighed against the defendant in
a fair use analysis.7 °
instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.
Id.
65. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1535.
66. Id. at 1536. "Kinko's is in the business of providing copying services for whomever is willing to pay for them and, as evidenced in this case, students of colleges and
universities are willing to pay for them." Id. "Kinko's intentionally and as a market
strategy targeted college buyers and aggressively pursued their business through its Professor Publishing business." Id. at 1544.
67. Id. at 1536 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[E]). The court assumed that
the socially useful objectives of a nonprofit university copy shop will always differ from a
for-profit copy shop though each copy shop is producing exactly the same materials for
exactly the same customer. Since each copy shop must compete against the other for the
educational business, the socially useful utility provided to the educational community is
identical.
68. Id. at 1535-36. The court suggested that the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines
"indicates that Congress saw the maelstrom beginning to churn and sought to clarify,
through broad mandate, its intentions." Id. For a sharply critical view of using this kind
of legislative history to support a position such as this, see Scalia, supra note 12.
69. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536. "There is dispute as to whether the Guidelines
represent a maximum or minimum of allowable copying." Id. The notion of a controversy concerning whether the Agreement of Classroom Guidelines represents a maximum
or minimum of allowable copying is erroneous. See supra note 62.
70. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1537. The facts are undisputed that Kinko's copying
was clearly more extensive than the Agreement permits since it allows copying up to
"1,000 words or 10% of the work, whichever is less." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 10, at 69. However, the court's opinion reveals that it saw Kinko's photocopying beyond that permitted by the Agreement as weighing against a finding for fair use.
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Once again, the Kinko's court missed the point. Reliance on the
Agreement on Classroom Guidelines for guidance about fair use is
questionable at best. The Agreement was not included in the legislative history to change the law "in any way."' 7' It does not limit
copying but instead sets forth bright line rules that indicate when
teachers are within a safe harbor. 2 Even as a safe harbor, though,
73
the Agreement is not especially illuminating. It is so restrictive
that most classroom uses are outside this safe harbor anyway. 74 By
design, the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines simply does not
provide meaningful standards for determining when classroom
uses infringe.
"Kinko's copying . . . is excessive and in violation of the Guidelines requirements."
Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536. "Kinko's conduct appears to violate a specific mandate of
the Classroom Guidelines .... " Id, at 1537. "Kinko's appears to have exempted itself
from the purview of the Guidelines altogether. To the contrary, being beyond the scope
of the Guidelines, to this court, still renders Kinko's subject to fair use law." Id. at 1545.
71. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 10, at 66.
72. The Agreement on Classroom Guidelines permits the following:
I. Single Copying for Teachers
A single copy may be made of any of the following by or for a teacher at his or
her individual request for his or her scholarly research or use in teaching or
preparation to teach a class: A. A chapter from a book; B. An article from a
periodical or newspaper ....
II. Multiple Copiesfor Classroom Use
Multiple copies (not to exceed in any event more than one copy per pupil in a
course) may be made by or for the teacher giving the course for classroom use
or discussion; provided that: A. The copying meets the tests of brevity and spontaneity as defined below; and, B. Meets the cumulative effect test as defined
below; and, C. Each copy includes a notice of copyright.
Id. at 68.
73. To be within the safe harbor, prose must be:
(a) [e]ither a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 words, or (b) an
excerpt from any prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 10% of the work,
whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 words ....
The inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum
teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission ....
There shall not be more
than nine instances of such multiple copying for one course during one class
term.... Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for
anthologies.... Copying shall not: . . . be repeated with respect to the same
item by the same teacher from term to term.
(D) No charge shall be made to the student beyond the actual cost of the,
photocopying.
Id. at 68-70.
74. See Debra E. Blum, Use of PhotocopiedAnthologiesfor Courses Snarled by Delays
and Costs of Copyright-PermissionProcess, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Sept. 11, 1991, at
A19-20 [hereinafter Blum].
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IV.

SOLUTION:

A POSITIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
75

OF FAIR USE LAW

Despite its good intentions in Kinko's, the court's orthodox balancing methodology will only generate confusion in future fair use
cases. The Kinko's court should have found Kinko's liable for
copyright infringement-but not merely because Kinko's made a
profit.76 Confusion will result from the court's conclusion that a
review of the fair use precedent can yield no coherent, predictable
interpretation of the fair use doctrine.7 7 By reaching this conclusion, the court missed a valuable opportunity to logically articulate
the existing fair use law. Additional confusion will result because
the Kinko's opinion misstates the theoretical underpinnings of
75. In this section, we present an analysis of the fair use case law. There is not
sufficient space to mention each and every fair use case that has been handed down by a
federal court. We have examined all fair use cases decided by the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts of appeals since 1976, and have found no holdings that refute our theory of
economic substitution.
Our view of the case law does not purport to explain a line of copyright cases known as
"Parody or Disparagement" where defendants have often claimed fair use. See, e.g.,
Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is
infringement liability for defendant's rap song that parodied plaintiff's pop hit); Eveready
Battery Co. v. Adolf Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding there is no
infringement liability for a defendant whose television commercial spoofed the plaintiff's
Eveready "Bunny"); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding there
is infringement liability for defendants whose sculpture duplicated and parodied the
plaintiff's "Puppies" paragraph); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard
Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding there is infringement liability for
defendants who produced a poster of a cheerleader similar to the plaintiff's poster but
with topless cheerleaders); Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding there is infringement liability for defendant's comic books that parodied
plaintiff's cartoon characters); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1964) (holding there is infringement liability for defendant's magazine that parodied
plaintiff's songs); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding there is
infringement liability for defendant's television skit that burlesqued plaintiff's movie);
Columbia Picture Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding there is no
infringement liability for defendant's television skit that parodied plaintiff's movie).
76. After all, if the law allows educational institutions to engage in photocopying
similar to that in Kinko's (i.e., fair use without permission and without royalty payments
to copyright owners), then Kinko's photocopying business logically should also operate
within the law.
The Kinko's court stated that "this court does not consider copying performed by students, libraries, nor on-campus copy-shops, whether conducted for-profit or not."
Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n. 13. The perverse result of the Kinko's court's implicit
approval of campus copying is that students might pay more for course packets produced
by campus shops, and the copyright holders would still be injured. As this Article suggests, the siphoning off of demand for original works occurs whether or not the copy shop
makes a profit.
77. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1530; see also Blum, supra note 74, at A19 (demonstrating the need to eliminate the uncertainty with respect to the fair use doctrine and to
provide educators with a reliable and workable rule of law).
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copyright law. As a result of dicta in the court's opinion, nonprofit
photocopy shops and individual teachers will continue to copy protected material, publishers and authors will continue to suffer economic harm, and college students may continue to pay more for
photocopied course packets.78
Contrary to the court's statements in Kinko's, the doctrine of
fair use is neither mysterious nor merely intuitive. Fair use need
not be understood as an unorganized collection of exceptions to the
rules of copyright. Instead, fair use should be understood as a rational and necessary part of copyright law, the observance of which
is essential to achieve the goals of that law. 79 As this section will
demonstrate, the cases reveal that economic substitution is the appropriate standard by which to analyze fair use.
A. History of Copyright Law and Fair Use
Copyright law vests a bundle of rights in the creator of certain
kinds of intellectual property."g The term copyright literally means
the exclusive right to copy. s" While some intellectual property,
like computer software, is the product of cutting-edge technology,
the doctrine vesting property rights in the creators of intellectual
property is over three hundred years old."2
Copyright law, both ancient and modem, is founded on the fundamental, though perhaps implicit, notion that adverse economic
incentives are created if unrestricted copying of intellectual products is permitted. When adverse incentives exist, society will not
have as much creative innovation as it wishes to encourage.8 3
Therefore, the emphasis of copyright law is on the benefits derived
78. See Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n. 13. In reality, many university copy shops
engage in practices identical to Kinko's. See Blum, supra note 74, at A 19-20. At around
five cents per page before royalty charges, Kinko's charges less than the ten to twenty-five
cents many nonprofit university copy centers and self-service machines charge per copy.
79. Leval, supra note 8, at 1107.
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1992).
81. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to copy the work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1) (1992).
82. See LYMAN R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968)
[hereinafter PATTERSON]; see also AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE
LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1971) (discussing early copyright law).
83. See Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.) (stating that its purpose is
"the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books"); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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by the public from the creative efforts of authors.84 Reward to
copyright owners or authors is a necessary but secondary consideration.85 Historically, the exception to copyright protection, known
as fair use, applied to circumstances where the policy of rewarding
an author's creativity would not be undermined."6
Some might ask how copyright monopolies can be tolerated in
light of our society's general belief in the value of free markets.
Copyright law might seem counterintuitive. The best explanation
is that the monopolistic benefits conferred upon individual authors
are acceptable because they encourage innovation. 7 Copyright
law promotes a higher level of innovation than would normally
exist if these "public goods" were not legally protected. 8
If intellectual property were not protected, many authors would
wait for another to create a literary work and then take the work
away from the innovator. Authors would be less likely to expend
their own efforts because as soon as their efforts had been expended, some other person would steal the work.8 9 Thus, creation
of intellectual property presents a classic free rider 9° situation.
The common law of copyright and fair use implicitly recognized
the tension arising from the free rider problem, disincentives, monopoly, and access to information in a free society. The fair use
doctrine eventually developed to address this tension. 91 In some
limited circumstances, fair use permits someone other than the author to copy a copyrighted work without the author's permission.
Although its roots go back much further, the doctrine of fair use
84. See Leval, supra note 8, at 1107-09 (underscoring the utilitarian principles that
support the copyright laws).
85. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429. "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration." Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)).
86. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
87. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1661 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher] (analyzing how the free goods theory is incorporated into the doctrine of fair use); RoY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMics 24-25, 29, 705-06 (1985) [hereinafter RUFFIN & GREGORY] (discussing free goods and free riders); see also Leval, supra note 8, at 1107-09 (discussing the
utilitarian and economic consequences of the fair use laws).
88. A "public good" is property for which the costs of protecting the property from
misappropriation outweigh the benefits to be derived from owning the property. Because
one cannot effectively benefit from ownership of a public good, one has no incentive to
create or maintain a public good. See Fisher, supra note 87, at 1700.
89. Id.
90. A free rider is someone who gains the benefit of an undertaking without personal
cost. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 87, at 24-25.
91. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
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did not fully emerge until the mid-nineteenth century. 92
1. The English Approach
Copyrights have been coveted property since the introduction of
the printing press by William Claxton in 1476.93 Copyright protection began when the Crown strictly regulated printing because of
its fears of Protestantism. By 1680, however, the Crown's censorship of the publishing industry had begun to wane. 94 By 1695, the
printing industry had fallen into chaos with the lapse of the Printing Act of 1662. 9 1 After over a hundred years of government protection, the stationers-previously the sole beneficiaries of the
royal printing permit-were ill-equipped to compete in the marketplace. Thus, the stationers lobbied for new laws to protect them
from competitive pressures. 96 Yielding to this appeal, Parliament
passed the Statute of Anne, 97 the first copyright act, with the intent
of extending the stationers' monopoly. 9 However, the stationers'
hope of continued monopoly profits was never realized. 99 After the
Statute of Anne was passed, the focus of copyright laws changed
from protecting the Crown and printers to promoting authorship.1°° Writing in England had become respectable, and Parliament wanted to be seen as encouraging the literary arts.'0 1 Thus,
the Statute stood for "the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books."'0 2
Paralleling modem copyright law, the Statute of Anne rewarded
authors with monopoly profits for a predetermined period of
time. 0 3 Further parallels can be found in the Statute's provisions
for infringement and registration. Infringement carried the penalty
92. See PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 16.
93. Id. at 20; BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967)
[hereinafter KAPLAN].
The Crown regulated the new printing industry with strict licensing requirements. By
1558, the mere possession of an unlawful book was a capital offense. KAPLAN, supra, at
3. Privileged book publishers, known as stationers, were issued the first known copyrights, called "letters patents." Id. The letters patents granted to the stationers an exclusive right to publish any book. Id. Like any monopoly, these patents were extremely
profitable for their owners. Id.
94. Id. at 5-6.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id.
97. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
98. KAPLAN, supra note 93, at 7.
99. Id. at 6.
100. See PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 151.
101. Id.
102. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
103. See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundationsof American Copyright Law:
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of statutory damages and destruction of the infringing material. "o4
Finally, registration was also required for protection. Before they
could enforce their copyrights, authors had to have the book's title
registered with the Stationer's company prior to its publication.105
With these provisions, the Statute of Anne eventually became a
model for copyright law in the United States.
2.

Copyrights in the United States
Based loosely on the Statute of Anne, each of the original American colonies adopted its own particular variant of copyright
law.' 06 Later, the Framers of the Constitution sought uniform
laws for the new states.' 7 Article I of the Constitution empowers
Congress to enact laws "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 0 8 One cannot ignore the clear utilitarian principles
underpinning the Framers' choice of language: "To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."" Historically, the constitutional reward of a monopoly to authors was a means of promoting public good by creating an incentive for authors to
create. 0 The Supreme Court gave the fullest expression to this
policy in a classic case involving two biographies of George
Washington.
3. Folsom v. Marsh: The Classic Statement of
the Fair Use Doctrine
Folsom v. Marsh 11 still stands as the classic exposition of the
fair use doctrine. It is authoritatively cited, even today, as valid
law." 2 In Folsom, the plaintiffs were printers and publishers who
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1140-41
(1983) [hereinafter Abrams].
104. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.). "[S]uch offender or offenders
shall forfeit such book... to the proprietor.., who shall forthwith damask and make
waste paper of them; and further, That every such offender or offenders shall forfeit one
penny for every sheet which shall be found in his, her or their custody...." Id.
105. Id.ch. 19 § 2. "[B]ooks hereafter published shall, before such publication, be
entred, in the register book of the company of stationers .. " Id.
106. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 1172-73.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
109. See Leval, supra note 8, at 1105 (describing the economic and utilitarian motives
behind the copyright provision in the Constitution).
110. Id.at 1107-10.
111. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
112. Folsom was the first American case to recognize the fair use exception to copy-
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had purchased a valid copyright from the author of The Writings
of George Washington.1 13 The defendants were a book-selling company and the author of The Life of Washington in the Form of an
Autobiography."4 The defendants admitted at trial that in writing
their version of Washington's autobiography, they had copied 388
pages, or 5.7%, from the plaintiffs' treatise verbatim."1 5
Finding the defendants guilty of infringement, the circuit court,
in an opinion written by Justice Story, distinguished the defendants' infringement from fair use. 11 6 Justice Story explained that a
third party could cite large portions from an original text in a critical review, if his clear use of the passages was for the purpose of
criticism. 117 However, if a third party cited the most important
parts of a copyrighted work "with a view, not to criticise, but to
supersede the use of the original work," that use was an infringement and would not be permitted.' s
Justice Story wrote that allowing the copying of protected works
"would operate as a great discouragement" to the creation of furight law developed in England in the mid-eighteenth century. See Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 550; Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 476. The English have cited Justice Story's Folsom
decision as the best explanation of the common law fair use doctrine. See PATRY, supra
note 2, at 3.
113. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 343. The full title of the work was: The Writings of George
Washington, being his correspondence, addresses, messages, and other papers, official and
private, selected and published from the original manuscripts, with a life of the author,
notes, and illustrations, by Jared Spark& Id. The work, 6763 pages bound into 12
volumes, consisted of both private and public letters of the first President. Id. The plaintiffs were the only known publishers of some of this material. Id. at 343-44.
114. Id. The full title was: The Life of Washington in the Form of an Autobiography,
the narrativebeing to a great extent conducted by himself in extracts and selectionsfrom
his own writings, with portraitsand other engravings. Id. The two book titles in Folsom
demonstrate that at one time it was possible to judge a book by its cover.
115. Id. In Folsom the defendants argued that there was no infringement for the
following reasons:
I. The papers of George Washington are not subjects of the copyright.
1. They are manuscripts of a deceased person, not injured by publication
of them.
2. They are not literary, and, therefore, are not literary property.
3. They arepublic in their nature, and, therefore, are not privateproperty.
4. They were meant by the author for public use.
II. [The Plaintiff) is not the owner of these papers, but they belong to the
United States, and may be published by any one.
III. An author has a right to quote, select, extract or abridge from another, in
the composition of a work essentially new.
Id. at 344 (emphasis added). A similarity exists between the defendants' assertions in
Folsom and the modern fair use defense. The basis of the arguments in both cases is that
public policy requires that copying be allowed in order to satisfy the public good.
116. Id. at 349.
117. Id. at 344.
118. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 (emphasis added).
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ture works if the copying would compete with the use of the original work.'" 9 He reasoned that fair use should not apply to
situations where creators of original works would be discouraged
from investing in authorship.'
Justice Story went on to state the
now-famous test of fair use: "[W]e must often ... look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree to which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work."121
One hundred and thirty-five years after Justice Story wrote the
Folsom opinion, Congress codified the common law principles of
copyright and fair use in section 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976.122 Acknowledging the importance of the fair use case law
dating back to Folsom, Congress expressed its intent to "restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 123
B. Policy Goals Behind Copyright and Fair Use
The Constitution plainly states that the "exclusive Right[s] to
their respective Writings and Discoveries" given to authors exist
only because of statutory enactment and are unmistakably tied to
"the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 24 Further, the fact that
copyrights are only granted "for limited times" confirms that these
exclusive rights are neither absolute nor morally necessary and that
the rights may expire when they no longer 1serve
the utilitarian goal
25
of progress in science and the useful arts.
The original utilitarian principle underlying copyright law is still
the accepted objective and foundation of recent decisions by the
Supreme Court. In Harper & Row, 1 26 the Court explained that
"[t]he rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contrib119. Id.at 347.
120. Id. Justice Story stated:
What descendant, or representative of the deceased author, would undertake to
publish, at his own risk and expense, any such papers; and what editor would be
willing to employ his own learning, and judgment, and researches, in illustrating such works, if, the moment they were successful, and possessed the substantial patronage of the public, a rival bookseller might republish them, either in
the same, or in a cheaper form, and thus ... take from him the whole profits?
Id.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 348.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1992).
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 10, at 66.
Leval, supra note 8, at 1108.
Id.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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utors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors" 127 and
"to motivate the creative activity of authors ... by the provision of
a special reward." 2 Therefore, copyright law "rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public."1 29 The Supreme
Court has also confirmed that fair use limitations exist when exclusive intellectual property rights will not serve the progress of the
useful arts. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Court stated that "[tihe monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed
to provide a special private benefit .... 'The copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.' a130
When enforcement of copyrights would not advance the
constitutional goals behind the law, a fair use defense will be
successful. 131
In Folsom v. Marsh, 32 the court implicitly relied on classical
economic principles when it denied the defendant the right to
copy. Justice Story reasoned that unlimited copying of historically
significant works would discourage the preservation of historical
materials and that such materials "would become far more scanty"
without copyright protection.1 33 The keystone of Story's analysis
was to determine if the secondary use could become a substitute for
the original work. He stated that "if [the alleged infringer] thus
cites the most important parts of the work, with a view . . . to
supersede the use of the original work, and substitute [the secondary use] for [the original use], such a use will be deemed in law a
piracy [or unfair use]."'' 34 If copies were allowed to substitute for
original works, a disincentive for individual creativity would result.
This disincentive is precisely what the Framers of the Constitution
sought to prevent.
127. Id. at 546 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
128. Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429).
129. Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J. dissenting)).
130. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
131. Cf Leval, supra note 8, at 1110. Leval argues that the person claiming fair use
has the-burden of showing that the use "serves the copyright objective of stimulating
productive thought and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives
for creativity." Id.
132. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342.
133. Id. at 347.
134. Id. at 344-45.
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C.

The Statutory Factors of the Copyright Act

Justice Story is credited with being the first to outline the test of
fair use eventually codified as the four statutory fair use factors of
the 1976 Copyright Act. 135 In analyzing each of these four factors,
the focus should remain on preventing a potential substitution of
the original work by the secondary work. 136 In different cases,
some factors will often be more illustrative of economic substitution than others. However, the factors should not be understood to
be a mere litany of requirements that must be met or balanced.
Rather, they should be understood to provide different perspectives
of the central test: Does the use by the defendant serve as a market
substitutefor the original? If it does, then the copier is infringing.
If not, the copier is entitled to the fair use defense. As will be
shown in the
following sections, courts have recognized this basic
37
principle. 1
To determine whether copying is entitled to fair use protection,
courts need not engage in vague balancing tests and assessments of
equities. For example, because the course packets substituted for
the original works, the copying in Kinko's was a classic case of an
unfair use. In Kinko's, each and every one of the four factors
demonstrates that Kinko's photocopying served as an economic
substitute for the original work. Thus, regardless of whether or
not Kinko's made a profit, its copying was an unfair use of the
original materials.
D.

The Fair Use Case Law. A Recognition of
Economic Market Substitution
1. Purpose and Character of the Secondary Use
The first factor of the fair use provision of the Copyright Act
directs the courts to examine how the purpose and character of the
alleged fair use would affect the original work. One might rephrase
this as a question of whether the purpose and character of the secondary use discourages the objective of copyright law to stimulate
135. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
136. As one federal district court judge has aptly written:
The [four] factors do not represent a score card that promises victory to the
winner of the majority. Rather, they direct courts to examine the issue from
every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and how powerfully, a
finding of fair use would serve or disserve the objectives of the copyright [law].
Leval, supra note 8, at 1110-11.
137. For a more practice-oriented explanation of the market substitution theory, see
Michael G. Anderson et al., Market Substitution in Copyright: UnderstandingFair Use
Case Law, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. Issue 2 (forthcoming 1993).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

creativity. 138
The key inquiry is whether the secondary and primary uses are
so similar in nature that the one can serve as a substitute for the
other. For example, if the purpose and character of both the primary and secondary use is educational, then the likelihood of a
substitution occurring is increased. In this case, fair use would
properly be denied. However, if the purpose and character of the
primary use is political, for example, and the secondary use is entertainment, then a fair use is likely to be found. A court should
not determine the purpose and character of the secondary use and
then check it against a list of uses favored by a judge as good public
policy.
Section 107 exemplifies a "nonprofit educational purpose" as a
characteristic that will not interfere with the ordinary "commercial
nature" of copyrighted work. However, a "nonprofit educational
purpose" may not always indicate a fair use.139 In Marcus v.
Rowley, 1 for example, the defendant's employee, a public high
school teacher, copied eleven out of thirty-five pages from the
plaintiff's cake-decorating book. 141 As was the case with many of
the books copied in Kinko's, the purpose and character of both the
primary and the secondary works in Marcus were educational.
Furthermore, in Marcus, the purpose and character of the defendant's use were unquestionably nonprofit.142 Despite these considerations, the circuit court reversed the district court and held that
143
the Marcus defendant infringed by copying the plaintiff's book.
The court stated that when a secondary use is created "for the
same intrinsic purpose for which the copyright owner intended
[the original work]," such a use "is strong indicia of no fair use."'"
Thus, the Marcus court recognized that nonprofit educational uses
are mere examples of secondary uses that are unlikely to conflict
with the purpose and character of the original use. Under Marcus,
even if it is generally held to be a fair use under section 107, the
secondary use is not likely to be considered fair if it overlaps with
the purpose and character of the primary use.
The Marcus case is not an isolated example of this position. In
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
at 1175.
143.
144.

Leval, supra note 8, at 1111.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992).
695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1173.
The defendant's employee distributed the book to students at no charge. See id.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1175.
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Harper & Row, 45 the defendant copied the plaintiff's manuscript
for a magazine article.' 4 6 Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists
criticism, comment, and news reporting as ordinarily fair uses. 4 "
However, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's use was not
a fair use.'48 The outcome in Harper & Row is understandable if
one recognizes that the purpose and character of both the plaintiff's and defendant's works were the same.' 49 Both uses related to
news reporting, and they were close enough for the secondary use
to effectively substitute for the original work. Thus, while news
reporting may not ordinarily conflict with the purpose and character of a primary work, in Harper& Row the defendant's secondary
use was such a successful substitute that the market for the plaintiff's original copyrighted work was totally destroyed.'
In Harper& Row, the Court also mentioned that "the fact that a
publication was commercial.., tends to weigh against a finding of
fair use." 5 ' Such dictum can be a trap for the unwary. The profit
factor cannot explain why, when almost all newspapers operate for
a profit, the general rule is that profit-making newspapers have a
broad privilege with respect to fair use.
The court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc. underscored the fact that a defendant's profit should not be determinative.' 52 In Hustler, a caricature of the defendant Jerry Falwell
was featured as a cartoon in Hustler magazine. Outraged, Falwell
had a page from the plaintiff's magazine photocopied and mass
mailed in an effort to raise money for the Moral Majority. ' 53 The
Hustler court held that while the purpose and character of
Falwell's use were certainly profitmaking or even purely commercial, 5 4 they were so different from the magazine's use that he and
the Moral Majority were entitled to the fair use exception. 55 Be145. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
146. Id. at 543.
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
148. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
149. Id. at 561-62.
150. The Court noted that "[w]ith certain special exceptions. . . a use that supplants
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement." Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 562.
152. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. Id. at 1150.
154. Id. at 1152. As a result of the mailing, the defendants received at least $717,000.
Id. at 1150. Because the defendants used the cartoon for a profit-making purpose, the
orthodox fair use reasoning would hold that their use was presumptively unfair. Id. at
1152.
155. Id. at 1156.
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cause the purpose and character of Falwell's use, although forprofit, was different from the magazine's use, it could not substitute
for the original work. Thus, even in Hustler,where the defendant's
work was for a commercial purpose, the decisive factor was
whether the purpose and character of the secondary work was sufficiently similar to that of the plaintiff's work that it could serve as
a market substitute for the primary work.
In Kinko's, the purpose and character of both the college textbooks and the photocopied course packets created by Kinko's was
educational. Because they covered the same subject matter and
satisfied the same market demand as the textbooks, the course
packets could become a total substitute for the copied textbooks.
Had the course packets not contained excerpts from textbooks but
rather excerpts from a law review not marketed for sale to students, for example, a fair use might have been allowed. With a law
review article, a court could find fair use since the professor's secondary use of the article would not serve as a market substitute for
the original work.
As in Marcus, Harper & Row, and Hustler, the question of
whether Kinko's use was best characterized as commercial or nonprofit and educational was misleading and unnecessary. In
Kinko's, the key reason for denying fair use was that because the
course packets and the plaintiffs' college textbooks were both educational, the course packets could serve as a substitute for the textbooks. Regardless of its profit-making status, or the educational
values involved, Kinko's created an economic substitute for the
original work. Consequently, Kinko's could not receive the benefits of the fair use exception.
Thus, the best understanding of the first prong of the fair use test
is that the absolute purpose and character of the copyrighted work
is not important. Only the purpose and character of the original
work relative to the secondary use is relevant. Fair use is allowed
when the purpose and character of the two works are so dissimilar
that an economic substitution will not occur.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor provides another perspective from which
courts can determine whether a secondary use can serve as an economic substitute for the original work. Some have suggested that
when the purpose of the work is factual in nature, the original
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work is entitled to less copyright protection. 56 Though the creative versus factual distinction may seem consistent with the general
rule that facts and ideas are not protected by copyrights, the distinction simply does not explain the case law unless one compares
the primary use with the secondary use.
In Hustler Magazine,57 the court admitted that the original
work, a cartoon of Jerry Falwell, was "more creative than informational," and in dicta stated that the creative nature of the work
restricted the scope of fair use. 15 Despite the creative nature of the
plaintiff's work, the Hustler court found fair use because "the defendants did not use the parody for its creative value."' 5 9 Thus,
even though the plaintiff's work was creative, the defendant was
entitled to a fair use privilege because he used the creative work in
an informational way.' 60
Another example of the substitution principle operating within
this second factor can be seen in Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Duncan.1 6 1 In Pacific & Southern, the defendant copied onto
videotape excerpts from the plaintiff's news broadcast and then
sold the tapes in a manner similar to a newspaper clipping service.62 The nature of news broadcasts is essentially factual. Thus,
63
this factor, under the orthodox reasoning, would favor a fair use.1
However, because the defendant's secondary use could substitute
for the primary use, fair use was denied even though both works
were factual.
The need to compare the primary and secondary uses was confronted again in Iowa State University v. American Broadcasting
Cos., Inc. "I In Iowa State, the defendant secondary user copied
the plaintiff's short biographical film of a college wrestler. 165
Again, the orthodox approach to fair use would hold that since the
original work was factual and informative, the second factor
should weigh in favor of fair use.' 66 Despite the factual nature of
67
the film in Iowa State, the court held that ABC was an infringer.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Leval, supra note 8, at 1117.
796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id.
744 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
Id. at 1493-94.
See Leval, supra note 8, at 1117.
621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 59.
See Leval, supra note 8, at 1117.
Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 62.
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The court observed that "[w]here the two works in issue fulfill the
same function ... the scope of fair use is ... constricted."1 6
The Kinko's court, following the orthodox analysis, argued that
the second factor weighed in Kinko's favor. 169 However, since the
three other fair use factors outweighed the second factor, the court
held that Kinko's was an infringer.17 0 Unlike in Hustler, where the
natures of the secondary and original uses were different, in Pacific
& Southern, Iowa State, and Kinko's the nature of both the original
and secondary uses was factual and informative. The Kinko's
court reasoned that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, weighed in favor of Kinko's because the nature of
the copyrighted work was principally informative. 7 1 However, in
analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work, the second factor
actually should have weighed against Kinko's. Since both the secondary use and the original work were factual, the secondary use
could have served as a substitute for the original work. If the court
in Kinko's had viewed the second factor as another perspective
from which to determine whether the secondary use created an impermissible economic substitute for the original work, the court
would have correctly found that the second factor weighed against
fair use.
Dicta in some opinions have also suggested that an assessment of
the second factor hinges on whether the copyrighted work was in
print or out of print 172 or whether the copyrighted work was published or unpublished.' 73 These distinctions, however, can be
viewed as further evidence of whether the copyrighted work will
suffer an economic substitution by the secondary work.
For example, courts have considered the unpublished nature of
the original work an important reason for denying fair use. 174 This
reflects an implicit recognition that an unpublished work is especially susceptible to substitution by a secondary user. In Salinger
v. Random House, Inc.,
the plaintiff, J.D. Salinger, sought to
enjoin the publication of an unauthorized biography that contained
quotes from his unpublished letters. 7 6 The Second Circuit denied
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
'nature.'
175.
176.

Id. at 61 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13-05[B]).
Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1532-33.
See id. at 1533.
See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 553-64.
See id. at 564. "The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its
" Id. (citation omitted).
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
Id. at 92.
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a fair use claim, stating that "[unpublished] works normally enjoy
complete protection against copying any protected expression."' 77
As shown in Salinger, when a work is unpublished, a secondary
user can deny a copyright holder the benefits of first publication.
After the secondary user has published, the copyright owner cannot publish the original work without competing head to head with
the copier. Consumers could, thus, substitute the secondary work
for the original.
A correct understanding of the second factor can be summarized
as follows: The absolute nature of the copyrighted work is not important; only its nature relative to the secondary use is relevant.
Fair use is allowed when the nature of the two works is so dissimilar that a substitution will not occur.
3.

Amount and Substantiality Used

The third statutory factor provides yet another perspective from
which courts can compare the secondary use with the original use
to determine if an economic substitution is likely. Congress's concern over the substitution effect is evident from the statute's emphasis on the comparison between the original and the secondary
work.17 8 The orthodox approach to analyzing this factor looks to
the volume copied. The larger the volume or the greater the significance of the portion copied, the more likely it is that the secondary
use will be found to infringe. 79 In Marcus v. Rowley,' 80 for example, the defendant copied approximately half of the plaintiff's
8
The defendant's packet became such an effective subcookbook.'1
stitute for the plaintiff's original work that one student who enrolled in the plaintiff's cooking class, and who had a copy of the
defendant's packet, actually refused to purchase the original cookbook. 8 2 Thus, Marcus fits under the orthodox reasoning as an example of how extensive copying can defeat a claim of fair use.
As mentioned previously, however, the orthodox gloss is not always reliable. 8 3 To accurately predict case outcomes, the analysis
must focus on the likelihood of substitution when evaluating the
177. Id. at 97.
178. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that a factor to be considered in determining whether a work is a fair use is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1992).
179. See Leval, supra note 8, at 1122.
180. 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 1173. The plaintiff had copied 15 of 35 pages.
182. Id. at 1177.
183. See supra notes 138-77 and accompanying text.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

amount copied. By focusing, instead, merely on the amount copied, the usual understanding of the third factor fails to adequately
account for the case holdings. In Iowa State, 8 4 for instance, the
defendant telecast a mere two and one-half minutes of the plaintiff's twenty-eight minute film.185 The defendant asserted that
"such limited copying is [quantitatively] insignificant."' 8 6 The
court implicitly recognized, however, that since the defendant's
secondary use could substitute for the sale 18of7 the plaintiff's film,
the fair use defense would not be available.
When evaluating the third factor, the Supreme Court has applied an analysis similar to that used in Iowa State. In Harper &
Row, 88 for instance, the Court denied the defendant's fair use
claim despite the fact that the amount copied was quantitatively
insignificant. The Harper& Row defendant had obtained an unauthorized copy of Gerald Ford's memoirs. Quoting a mere 300
words from the plaintiff's large book, the defendant published its
own story.189 Despite this de minimis copying, the Supreme Court
refused to find a fair use.190 Stating that the qualitative importance
of the material taken must also be considered, the Court agreed
with the district court judge that "the [defendant] took what was
essentially the heart of the [original work]."' 9 1
However, the Court's dicta implying that courts should undertake a qualitative analysis may be misleading. In Hustler v. Moral
Majority, Jerry Falwell had photocopied an entire cartoon from the
plaintiff's magazine. 92 Despite Falwell's 100% copying, the Ninth
Circuit allowed Falwell a fair use because the cartoon, as it appeared in Falwell's fund-raising letter, was unlikely to siphon off
demand for Hustler magazine. 93 The court in Hustler rightly focused not only on the qualitative and quantitative copying but also
on the likelihood that the secondary use would substitute for the
original work.
184. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
185. Id. at 58-59.
186. Id. at 61.
187. Id. at 62.
188. 471 U.S. at 569.
189. Id. at 543.
190. Id. at 550. The Court implicitly recognized the substitution analysis when it
stated that "the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that 'supersede[s] the use of
the original.'" Id. (citations omitted). "With certain special exceptions ... a use that
supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be
considered an infringement." Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 564-65.
192. 796 F.2d at 1150.
193. Id. at 1156.
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In Kinko's, as in Marcus, Iowa State, and Harper & Row, the
argument that the packets became a substitute for the original
works is strongest because the original works copied were textbooks. By selecting complementary chapters from a number of
textbooks, a professor could assemble a packet that could substitute for any of the books individually--even though the professor
copied only a small amount of text from any one textbook.
This principle becomes even more telling when out-of-print textbooks are introduced into the scenario. In a textbook that covers
the fundamentals of some subject, often only a few chapters contain new or updated material. Textbooks by their very nature contain a great body of background information that is unlikely to
change from year to year. A professor who wished to defeat an inprint copyright could simply copy large sections of background information from out of print textbooks and copy small sections of
updated material from the most current textbooks. Thus, a primary work, such as a textbook, could easily be replaced by the
secondary work. This underscores the principle that disincentives
for new publications are created when secondary uses are allowed
to become economic substitutes for originals.
Unfortunately, the Kinko's court reached its conclusions on the
third factor without analysis. 94 Although the facts in Kinko's reveal that university professors copied between 5 and 14% of the
plaintiffs' original in-print works, and between 15 and 23% of the
original out-of-print works, no insight can be gleaned from the
court's analysis. 95 Each party in Kinko's cited cases that found
the disputed copying to be quantitatively permitted or excluded
under a fair use analysis. 196 However, they introduced no evidence
to indicate what types of books were copied or how easily the
books could be substituted by a secondary use. 197 Had the court
received evidence that revealed that some of the photocopying was
taken from textbooks, then any copying would likely have been
excessive under the third factor of the fair use analysis.
Thus, a correct understanding of the third factor can be stated as
follows: The absolute amount copied by a secondary user is not
important; what matters is the amount of the original that becomes
194. 758 F. Supp. at 1533. For example, the Kinko's court asserted, "This court finds
and concludes that the portions copied were critical parts of the books copied, since that
is the likely reason the college professors used them in their classes." Id.
195. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
197. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533-34.
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substituted. Fair use is allowed when the amount copied from the
original work is such that a substitution is not likely to occur.
4.

Effect of the Use on the Market for the Copyrighted Work

The fourth factor, "the effect of the [secondary] use on the potential market for the copyrighted work,"'' 9 is the final, most important, and most obvious way to examine the problem of market
substitution for an original work. It most succinctly captures the
genius of Justice Story's Folsom decision. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of the fourth factor when it stated that
"[tihis last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use." 199 This may reflect the Court's implicit understanding
of the economic theory underlying fair use law. Of all the factors,
the fourth is most highly correlated with the substitution effect,
because a decrease in the demand for a product is often a direct
result of a substitute product being introduced into the market. 200
However, as Judge Leval''2stated, "[n]ot every type of market impairment
opposes fair use. 1 0 The key is to ascertain whether the
market impairment was the result of the substitution effect. For
example, a criticism in a book review may impair a book's market,
yet it would still be a fair use.20 2 In New Era Publicationsv. Carol
Publishing Group,2 °3 the defendant published an unflattering biography of L. Ron Hubbard that included quotations from Hubbard's copyrighted works. Although the biography undoubtedly
had a marginally negative effect on the sale of Hubbard's own
works, the defendant was granted a fair use because the biography
did not serve as a substitute in the marketplace for the original
works. 2° In Hustler, even though the defendant copied the plaintiff's copyrighted work in an open campaign to impair the market
198. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1992).
199. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
200. Id. As product substitutes are introduced, the demand for the product decreases
and the price falls. The decrease in price coupled with a possible decrease in total market
share causes a loss of rent to the author. The loss of rent is the marginal disincentive on
the production of textbooks that the copyright law seeks to prevent. See RUFFIN &
GREGORY, supra note 87, at 393 (discussing market substitution). The degree of market
substitution may be determined by calculating the cross-price elasticity of the primary use
versus the secondary use. Id. at 395 (discussing the cross-price elasticity model); see also
Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Cross-Price Elasticity of Fair Use: Defining
Market Substitution (Oct. 9, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, presented at Brigham
Young University to the Marriott School of Management, on file with the authors).
201. See Leval, supra note 8, at 1125.
202. Id.
203. 904 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990).
204. Id. at 160-61.
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for the plaintiff's adult magazines, he did not seek to substitute his
secondary use for the original
work, and he was therefore entitled
20 5
to a fair use privilege.
When the secondary use is a substitute for the original work, the
26
secondary use is inconsistent with fair use. In Stewart v. Abend, 0
the plaintiff owned the copyright to a magazine story. Without
permission, the defendants, Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart,
created the successful movie Rear Window based on the plaintiff's
popular story.20 7 In finding the defendants' movie an unfair use of
the plaintiff's original work, the Supreme Court stated "that rerelease of the film impinged on the ability to market new versions
of the story. ' 20 8 In other words, if the plaintiff were to decide to
make a movie based on his story, the defendants' movie would be a
substitute in the market for the plaintiff's potential movie.
If the defendant in Iowa State had been allowed to broadcast the
plaintiff's film as a fair use, no television network would have been
willing to pay the creators of the film for it. 209 Without the opportunity to own and market television rights, far fewer such films
might have been created. If the defendant in either Stewart or Iowa
State had been allowed to substitute his secondary use for the
plaintiff's original work, the incentive for "authors" to create such
works would have decreased.
In Kinko's, the professors copied textbook excerpts to create
what amounted to a substitute textbook. 2 10 The unfairness in
Kinko's was not the professors' finding a substitute for a textbook
but rather was their using photocopies of the textbook's own pages
to substitute for the textbook itself. Because in one instance a class
had only three students, Kinko's tried to argue that the harm to the
plaintiff was insignificant. 21' However, as the Supreme Court
stated in Harper & Row, "to negate fair use one need only show
that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would ad205. Hustler,796 F.2d at 1156. "[T]he Defendants used the copies to generate moral
outrage against their 'enemies' and thus stimulate monetary support for their political
cause." Id.; see also Consumers Union v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1983) (stating that where the copy does not compete with the original, the concern
that creation of the original work will be discouraged is absent). But see Pacific & Southern, 744 F.2d at 1496 (finding against a fair use where the copy competes in a potential
market with the original).
206. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
207. Id. at 211-12.
208. Id.at 238.
209. 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1534.
211. See Defendant's Proposed Conclusions, supra note 29, at 15-16.
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versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.' ",212
Therefore, one can see how the extensive photocopying in Kinko's,
whether done for profit or not, could2 13"adversely affect the potential
market for the copyrighted work.

A proper understanding of this fourth factor is as follows: The
not
absolute amount of market harm caused by a secondary user is,
important; only market harm that is caused by economic substitution matters.
V.

CONCLUSION

For too long, fair use has been treated as a largely unprincipled,
odd exception to the broad protection offered by copyright. Critics
have been quick to deride the doctrine as a mere concession to
conflicting interests. They have also been quick to dismiss, as
wrongly decided, cases that do not fit into their particular theories
of the case law. In this Article, we have argued for a different
understanding of copyright fair use. We have sought to reach
deeper into the case law to find an underlying rationality.
We have argued that the fair use cases recognize the principle of
economic substitution as a guiding force. Courts presented with
fair use questions find fair use when the secondary use does not act
as a market substitute for the original work. When a secondary
use siphons off demand for the original by acting as a substitute,
however, the secondary use is found to infringe, and fair use is
denied. The statutory factors of the Copyright Act should be seen
as a way to reach this determination. The traditional, orthodox
balancing of the statutory factors, as was done in Kinko's, is ill
advised. This balancing is difficult to perform judicially and is not
useful for those seeking to predict actual case outcomes. In contrast, assessing secondary uses in light of the economic substitution
analysis we have presented is a highly accurate way to predict the
outcome of actual cases. In fact, this assessment accurately accounts for all the fair use decisions handed down since 1976.
In Kinko's, the copy shop was liable for copyright infringement
only because the professors were also guilty of a copyright violation. Because the professors' copying of original textbooks acted as
a market substitute for the textbooks from which they copied, the
publishers were harmed. Allowing this type of substitution would
have defeated the purposes behind the copyright law. The court's
212.
213.

471 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451).
Id.
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orthodox and superficial analysis found that copying for classroom
use is in the public's best interest. The real question in Kinko's,
however, was whether the secondary use discouraged the creation
of textbooks. If secondary uses, such as those in Kinko's, were to
become pervasive, the day would eventually come when there
would be far fewer textbooks for students to read, regardless of
how or where they purchased them.
The logic and consistency of the fair use case law is a far better
predictor of actual case outcomes than is the incomplete and deficient orthodox analysis used by the Kinko's court and favored by
some commentators. To understand the logic and consistency of
fair use, one must look to the facts and holdings of the cases.
Those who are involved with copyright fair use should look to the
cases and determine what the courts are doing rather than what
they are saying. The cases reveal an understanding of economic
substitution as the proper guiding force for fair use analysis. When
it comes to assessing fair use, economic substitution is what counts.

